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Graduate School Support: One Last Dip Into
The Proverbial Parental Pocketbook
The parents of a young child dissolve their marriage. The mother is
awarded custody of the child and the father is ordered to make support
payments until the child is emancipated or graduates from college,
whichever occurs first. Many years later, the child graduates from col-
lege and is accepted into a graduate school program. The mother moves
to amend the divorce decree to compel the father to make further sup-
port payments. In most states, the father would not have to support the
child past the age of majority.' In others, his duty to support ends when
the child graduates from college.2 In still other jurisdictions, the father's
duty of support is based upon dependency,' thus opening the possibility
that the father may have to support the child through graduate school."
' Veron, Parental Support of Post-Majority Children in College: Changes and
Challenges, 17 J. FAM. L. 645, 651 (1979). Some child support statutes accomplish this by
limiting the parental duty of support to "minor" children. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3103.03 (Page 1980); cf. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 14.05 (Vernon 1975) (duty to support
ends when child reaches age 18). But cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (Supp. 1980) (age of ma-
jority 18, but divorce court may order child support until child reaches age 21). Other states
judicially limit the duty of support to the minority of the child. See, e.g., Godec v. Godec,
346 So. 2d 459, 460 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
' See IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (West Supp. 1980) ("Such obligation may include support
for a child who is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two years who is ... in good
faith, a full-time student in a college, university, or area school; or has been accepted for ad-
mission to college, university, or area school."); cf. Lord v. Lord, 96 Misc. 2d 434, 409
N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (noting existence of exceptional circumstances would justify sup-
port order for child over age of 21); Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979)
(finding college to be "exceptional circumstance" giving court authority to order non-
custodial parent to support his child through four years of college).
3 See, e.g., Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); Childers v.
Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978) (construing The Dissolution of Marriage Act
of 1973, ch. 157, §§ 10, 17, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1215 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.09.100, .170 (Supp. 1981))); cf. Hoover v. Voigtman, 103 N.J. Super. 535, 539, 248
A.2d 136, 138 (Juv. and Dom. Rel. Ct. 1968) ("Consistent with such [social] advances is the
realization that age alone is not the determinative factor in evaluating an obligation to sup-
port.").
As most graduate school students are over the age of majority, the scope of this note is
limited to jurisdictions which do not, either by statute or through case law, arbitrarily limit
the duty of support by the age of the child.
See In re Marriage of Edelstein, 82 Ill. App. 3d 574, 403 N.E.2d 323 (1980). This case
involved an appeal from dissolution of marriage judgment in which the custodial parent, the
wife, was ordered by the court to pay the child's educational expenses out of the $1,000
child support she received from the noncustodial father each month. The appellate court
disagreed, however, and ordered the father to pay the child's educational expenses in addi-
tion to the regular child support. With respect to the child's post-high school education, the
court declared that "the cost of his college and professional education, should be paid by
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
While a substantial body of law has been developed for awarding
child support payments for undergraduate students,' few cases address
the issue of support payments for graduate students.' The concept of
graduate school7 support "focuses on the recurring question of the outer
limits of the support obligation for a child who has attained majority."8
While the child support obligation should cease with a child's college
education in most cases, this note argues that in some circumstances the
award of graduate school support is both justified and required in order
to minimize the prejudice to the child caused by the divorce. First, the
tests developed in the college support9 cases will be examined and the
public policies underlying them will be discussed. The note will then
argue that the graduate school support issue should be analyzed from
the same public policy perspective as the college support cases and will
conclude that similar tests should be applied in graduate school cases.
Such a proposal should eliminate any uncertainty on the part of the
courts as to when, if ever, it is appropriate to require the noncustodial
parent to provide graduate school support, thereby ensuring that the
policies giving rise to the tests are appropriately furthered.
[the father] .... This result, we believe, is in keeping with the provisions of section 513 of
the Illinois Marriage and Marriage Dissolution Act." Id. at 577, 403 N.E.2d at 326 (emphasis
added).
Since this case did not involve a direct dispute regarding the propriety of graduate
school support, it may be that the court was simply being loose in its language when it
referred to "college and professional education." It seems more likely, however, given the
obvious differences between a college and professional education, that the court intended
the father to pay for Scott's education beyond a bachelor's degree. Furthermore, the court
indicated that professional school support is allowed under the Illinois Marriage and Mar-
riage Dissolution Act which provides:
[Tihe Court may also make such provision for the education and maintenance
of the child or children, whether of minor or majority age, out of the property
of either or both of its parents as equity may require, whether application is
made therefor before or after such child has, or children have, attained majori-
ty age.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 513 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
For a collection of these cases, see Annot., 99 A.L.R.3d 322 (1980).
See Ross v. Ross, 167 N.J. Super. 441, 400 A.2d 1233 (Ch. Div. 1979); Greenburg v.
Greenburg, 27 A.D.2d 952, 279 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1967); Colantoni v. Colantoni, 220 Pa. Super.
Ct. 46, 281 A.2d 662 (1971).
' For the purposes of this note, graduate school is defined as any higher level of educa-
tion beyond a bachelor's degree, including law school, medical school and other "profes-
sional" schools. College is defined as any education beyond high school which leads to either
an associate or bachelor's degree.
Ross v. Ross, 167 N.J. Super. 441, 442, 400 A.2d 1233, 1234 (Ch. Div. 1979).
For purposes of this note, college support will be defined as any parental support
received by the child while in college. This includes a support award that does not
specifically include the child's college expenses, but is merely a continuation of the support
provided by the noncustodial parent before the child entered college.
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COLLEGE SUPPORT
Probable Expectations of the Parent and Child
Over the last seventy years a body of law has evolved which requires
the noncustodial parent" to provide support for his children in college."
Although this obligation is part of the general child support obligation,'1 2
it is unique in that it is an obligation which will almost always continue
even beyond the time the child reaches the age of majority,13 traditional-
ly the age at which the child begins to be viewed as self-sufficient.14 The
ability of the child to support himself, however, is not the primary con-
cern in college support cases since almost any college student could be
self-supporting if he would leave college and obtain employment.1 5 Some
courts, when confronted with the college support issue, instead focus on
the prejudice to the child which may have resulted from the divorce."
One method by which they attempt to minimize such prejudice is to ex-
amine the probable expectations of the child and his parents prior to the
"o In a divorce situation, the noncustodial parent, ie., the parent who is not awarded
custody of the children of his or her dissolved marriage, typically is required to provide
financial support to the custodial parent for the expenses of raising the children. See
generally H. CLARK. THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 490-91 (1968).
Controversy results when the noncustodial parent believes the support to be too high or
simply refuses to pay it. In such a situation, the court may intervene as the parties have
already submitted their domestic problems to it for resolution. See Harris v. Harris, 585
P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1978). An interesting question arises, however, when the dispute is not
between the divorced parents but between the child and the custodial parent. Absent a
denial of necessaries to the child by the custodial parent, see note 51 infra, courts are
generally reluctant to interfere with parents' decisions on how to raise their children. See,
e.g., Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 272 N.E.2d 567, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971) (denying claim by 20
year-old against her father for reasonable support after he had cut off her support and
ordered her to return home from college). Disputes of this nature or disputes between
children and parents in intact families, however, are beyond the scope of this note.
" See generally, Inker & McGrath, College Education of Minors, 6 J. FAm. L. 230(1966); Veron, supra note 1; Washburn, Post-Majority Support. Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMP.
L.Q. 319 (1971); Comment, The Duty of a Father Under Pennsylvania Law to Support His
Child in College, 18 VILL. L. REv. 243 (1972).
" See H. CLARK, supra note 10, at 497-98. The duty to educate has long been placed on
parents. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *450-51; T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND
FEMME 418-20 (3d ed. 1867).
" The age of majority in most states is 18. Veron, supra note 1, at 646.
14 Where a child, because of a physical or mental disability, is unable to support himself,
his parents will often be required to support him past the age of majority. H. CLARK, supra
note 10, at 495; see, e.g., McCarthy v. McCarthy, 301 Minn. 270, 222 N.W.2d 331 (1974). But
see Reynolds v. Reynolds, 274 Ala. 477, 149 So. 2d 770 (1961).
" Werner v. Werner, 7 N.J. Super. 229, 231, 72 A.2d 894, 895 (1950) ("Were it not for
their desire for an education, it is safe to assume that [the children] would be self-
supporting.").
" Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 604, 575 P.2d 201, 208 (1978) (noting that some
disadvantages to children caused by divorce are "irremediable").
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divorce with respect to his college education.17 If, prior to the divorce,
the parents and child expected that the former would pay for college,
these courts reason that a divorce should not alter that expectation to
the prejudice of the child. 8
In order to determine the probable expectations of the parents and
child, courts often examine whether there was a plan, made by the
parents prior to the divorce, to support the child in college. 9 In Hutchin-
son v. Hutchinson," where the noncustodial father had purchased life in-
surance policies with the intention of using them to finance his son's col-
lege education, the court found sufficient evidence of such a plan to
make an award of college support."1 Essentially, the existence of a plan
demonstrates that the parents had already determined that their funds
were adequate and that the child had the requisite interest and
scholastic ability to benefit from college,' thus eliminating the need for
a detailed judicial examination of such factors to ascertain whether an
expectation existed within the family to send the child to college.,
There are instances, however, where there is little or no evidence of a
V, See, e.g., Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 593, 363 P.2d 795 (1961); Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J.
63, 275 A.2d 132 (1971); O'Shea v. Brennan, 88 Misc. 2d 233, 387 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1976);
Stoner v. Weiss, 96 Okla. 285, 222 P. 547 (1924); Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 263 Pa. Super.
Ct. 299, 397 A.2d 1218 (1979).
1" The maintenance of the child's lifestyle as it was before the divorce is a major goal of
child support. Puckett v. Puckett, 76 Wash. 2d 703, 706, 458 P.2d 556, 557-58 (1969). For fur-
ther discussion, see notes 30-31 & accompanying text infra.
" Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 593, 601, 363 P.2d 795, 802 (1961); see Gerk v. Gerk, 259
Iowa 293, 144 N.W.2d 104 (1966) (father's willingness to provide for child's education before
divorce one factor considered by court); Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1969) (father knew of daughter's plans to attend college and discussed it with her); cf.
Sunderwirth v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (considering any indica-
tion on part of father of willingness to provide college education); Commonwealth ex reL
Howell v. Howell, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 396, 181 A.2d 903 (1962) (finding implied agreement to
educate from fact that father purchased educational endowment policy during marriage).
263 Pa. Super. Ct. 299, 397 A.2d 1218 (1979).
1 Id. at 302, 397 A.2d at 1219. The court also noted that the father had used these
policies to finance the college educations of his two daughters. Id. at 302 n.1, 397 A.2d at
1219 n.1. But see Domenici v. Domenici, 5 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 2397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
Here the court noted that there was evidence which indicated that if the parties had re-
mained together, they would not have paid for the college education of the children. Id.
' For a discussion of these two factors and others, see notes 25-31 & accompanying text
infra.
, The courts assume that decisions made by the parents during their marriage were in
the child's best interests. In Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959),
the court observed: "In a normal household, parents ... direct their children as to when and
how they should work or study. That is on the assumption of a normal family relationship,
where parental love and moral obligation dictate what is best for the children." Id. at 38,
163 N.E.2d at 843; accord, Stoner v. Weiss, 96 Okla. 285, 222 P. 547 (1924). Thus a decision
made by a family while still intact to send a child to college should be weighed heavily by
the court, assuming there have been no great changes in the financial position of the parties
from the time the decision was made until the time the support is sought. See Sunderwirth
v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
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preconceived plan. 4 In these situations, the judicial inquiry necessarily
involves a more subjective and normally more difficult determination of
whether the noncustodial parent would have supported the child in col-
lege but for the divorce. Courts, in such cases, must search for such an
intent through an analysis of various factors.
Judges generally consider several factors' when examining the col-
lege support expectations within a family. For example, one factor in-
volves a determination by the court of whether that parent is financially
capable of assisting the child in obtaining a college degree." Generally,
unless such assistance will cause undue hardship, the noncustodial
parent will be found financially able to provide the support.' Another
See, e.g., Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Il1. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959); Commonwealth
ex rel. Larsen v. Larsen, 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 30, 234 A.2d 18 (1967). In both of these cases,
the divorce occurred when the child was very young. See also In re Marriage of Eusterman,
41 Or. App. 717, 598 P.2d 1274 (1979). The Eusterman court demonstrated how these situa-
tions can be handled by a modification of the decree when the child approaches college age.
Id at 727-28, 598 P.2d at 1281.
1 Some of the factors analyzed by the courts are "the social status of the father; the
educational background of the parents; the previous educational opportunities afforded the
children; the age of the child; .. . scholarships and other academic achievements; the
number of children in the family; the income of the custodial mother; and the amount of the
child's own savings." Note, The College Support Doctrine: Expanded Protection for the
Offspring of Broken Homes, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 425, 427-28 (footnotes omitted). Other fac-
tors are whether the child can attend college without the support, Risinger v. Risinger, 273
S.C. 36, 39, 253 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1979), and the future resources of the parents, Childers v.
Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 598, 575 P.2d 201, 205 (1978). The wide range of factors con-
sidered by the court is exemplified in Lord v. Lord, 96 Misc. 2d 434, 409 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup.
Ct. 1978), where one of the factors considered was: "The children have never been denied
anything, no matter how extravagant, as long as their parents have had ample resources."
I&i at 439, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 49. Note also that the statutory guidance often includes the
words "relevant factors." E.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 4801(a) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, 515 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-12 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE §
26.09.100 (Supp. 1981).
, See, e.g., Singer v. Singer, 70 Ill. App. 3d 472, 388 N.E.2d 1051 (1979); Delong v.
Delong, 161 Ind. App. 275,315 N.E.2d 412 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 217
Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 268 A.2d 161 (1970). See also Comment, supra note 11, at 251-56.
" See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Bacon v. Bacon, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 296, 292 A.2d 426
(1972) (noncustodial father ill and retired, support payment of $15 per week undue hardship
where he was paying $35 per week for other high school age son); Commonwealth ex rel
Grossi v. Grossi, 218 Pa. Super. Ct. 64, 272 A.2d 239 (1970); Golay v. Golay, 35 Wash. 2d 122,
210 P.2d 1022 (1949); Trembly v. Whiston, - W. Va. - , 220 S.E.2d 690 (1975) (father
not required to provide minor children with college education where his financial condition
made such expenditure unreasonable). But see Dorman v. Dorman, 251 Ind. 272, 241 N.E.2d
50 (1968). Dorman demonstrates the difficulty in defining undue hardship. The noncustodial
father was ordered to pay $40 per week for the support of two daughters in college while
his net income was only $75 per week.
Usually the courts will consider the finances of members of the broken family other than
the noncustodial parent. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 513(a), (c) (Smith-Hurd 1980). This
statute requires consideration of the financial resources of both parties and the child. Cf.
IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-12(1), (4) (Supp. 1980) (financial resources of both custodial and non-
custodial parents considered). Compare Dorman v. Dorman, 251 Ind. 272, 241 N.E.2d 50
(1968) (children's summer earnings were considered), with Gerk v. Gerk, 259 Iowa 293, 144
N.W.2d 104 (1966) (child's substantial savings did not end noncustodial father's duty of sup-
port).
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factor is the scholastic ability of the child.' Where it appears that the
child lacks the ability required to benefit from college, the courts will
not order college support.2 In considering still another factor -the fami-
ly's standard of living prior to the divorce-the courts examine the
lifestyle of the family and determine whether a college education was a
part of that lifestyle 0 Indeed, the lifestyle of a very wealthy family may
influence the court to order the noncustodial parent to send the child to
an expensive, private college."
Regardless of the manner by which courts determine whether the
parents would have sent their children to college had the family remained
intact, they are still furthering the same basic policy of minimizing the
prejudice to the child resulting from the divorce.2 The disadvantages in-
See, e.g., Dorman v. Dorman, 251 Ind. 272, 279, 241 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1968); Risinger v.
Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 39, 253 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1979); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592,
598, 575 P.2d 201, 205 (1978). However, the standard applied by the courts is not a strict
one. See, e.g., Ogle v. Ogle, 275 Ala. 583, 156 So. 2d 345 (1963) (matriculation in University
of Alabama as engineering student deemed sufficient evidence of child's scholastic ability);
Greiman v. Friedman, 90 Ill. App. 3d 941, 414 N.E.2d 77 (1980) (children's poor academic
records in college did not absolve father of duty to pay college expenses); IOWA CODE ANN. §
598.1 (West Supp. 1980) (acceptance of the child by a college may give rise to college sup-
port obligation). But see DeSantis v. DeSantis, 53 Pa. D. & C. 2d 747 (1971). The DeSantis
court found the child's ability to succeed in college questionable and refused to order her
father to support her while she attended a small, expensive and obscure college. However,
the basis for the denial of the support was that the daugther's decision to attehd this school
was unreasonable given the means of the father and her scholastic ability. Thus, the court
left open the alternative that should the child enroll in local, public, inexpensive institution,
it would again consider ordering her father to contribute to her college education. For a fur-
ther discussion of this issue, see Inker & McGrath, supra note 11, at 240-42.
1 DeSantis v. DeSantis, 53 Pa. D. & C. 2d 747 (1971). See also Sunderwirth v. Williams,
553 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). In Sunderwirth, the appellate court refused to enforce
an order directing the father to provide a college education to his children because there
was no showing that the children were capable of college work. Id at 894.
so See, e.g., Lord v. Lord, 96 Misc. 2d 434, 409 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Sup. Ct. 1978). In considering
whether exceptional circumstances existed under N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney
1977), to justify a support order past the age of 21, the court considered the following fac-
tors which relate to the lifestyle of the parties:
7. The children have been raised among other children and socialized in a
setting where it would be unusual for them not to go to college.
8. The children have never been denied anything, no matter how ex-
travagent, as long as the parents have had ample resources....
9. In their cultural, social and economic background, a college degree is a
prerequisite for suitable employment in the competition for present day
living.
96 Misc. 2d at 439, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 49 (citations omitted).
31 See Kaplan v. Kaplan, 57 A.D.2d 828, 394 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1977); cf. Rohn v. Thuma,
Ind. App. -, 408 N.E.2d 578 (1980) (agreement to provide "a four-year undergraduate col-
lege education" can be construed to include a private college).
I See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 580, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1390 (1978); Stoner
v. Weiss, 96 Okla. 285, 287, 222 P. 547, 549 (1924); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 604,
575 P.2d 201, 208 (1978). A child in a broken home is often referred to as a victim. See, e.g.,
Gaddis v. Gaddis, 20 Ill. App. 3d 267, 273, 314 N.E.2d 627, 632 (1974); O'Shea v. Brennan, 88
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cumbent upon a child of divorced parents are evidenced by the tendency
of the noncustodial parent to develop a life apart from the child of the
dissolved marriage, often leading him to abandon the parental respon-
sibilities he owes to that child: "[I]t is ,not the isolated exception that
noncustodial parents ... cannot be relied upon to voluntarily support
the children of the earlier marriage to extent they would have had they
not divorced."'
The courts, of course, realize that divorce places children in a difficult
situation.3' While they can do little to alleviate the emotional hardship
created by the noncustodial parent's abandonment of his traditional
role," they can and do attempt to "minimize any economic and educa-
tional disadvantages to the children of divorced parents."3 The ex-
amination of the probable expectations of the parents and child prior to
the divorce minimizes those disadvantages, attempting to place the
child in the same financial position that he occupied prior to the
divorce. 7
Society's Interest in Education
The child is often an innocent victim in a divorce.' Consequently, a
major concern of the court is to ensure that the child will not be denied
any benefits, educational or otherwise, that the parents would have pro-
vided but for the divorce. Yet that is not the court's only concern. It has
long been recognized that society has an independent interest in the
Misc. 2d 233, 235-36, 387 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214-15 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (sole purpose of exercise of
parens patriae jurisdiction is to protect child).
u Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 579, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1389-90 (1978) (animosity
toward custodial spouse cited as one cause of noncustodial parent's refusal to support); accord,
Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32,38,163 N.E.2d 840, 843 (1959); In re Marriage of Vrban,
293 N.W.2d 198,202 (Iowa 1980) (citing Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592,604,575 P.2d 201,
208 (1978)); cf. Nebel v. Nebel, 99 N.J. Super. 256, 263, 239 A.2d 266, 270 (1968) (noncustodial
father claimed to be financially unable to pay college expenses of child; court said he did not
lack money, he only lacked fatherly concern for maintenance of his son). See also Franklin Life
Ins. Co. v. Kitchens, 249 Cal. App. 2d 623, 631, 57 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1967).
See, e.g., Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 604, 575 P.2d 201, 208 (1978).
See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care,
and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 638 n.75 (1976). But see O'Shea
v. Brennan, 88 Misc. 2d 233, 387 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1976). In O'Shea, the court asserted
that the child had a right to "day-by-day love, care, discipline and protection of the parent
having custody." Id. at 236, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
5, Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 580, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1390 (1978).
See Singer v. Singer, 70 Il. App. 3d 472, 388 N.E.2d 1051 (1979). The court noted that
"[n]either has petitioner referred us to any ... evidence indicating that further contribu-
tions on respondent's part were necessary in order to bring the girls into the same financial
position with respect to their college educations as they. would have enjoyed had their
parents remained married." Id. at 475, 388 N.E.2d at 1054.
G Caddis v. Gaddis, 20 Ill. App. 3d 267, 273, 314 N.E.2d 627, 632 (1974); O'Shea v. Bren-
nan, 88 Misc. 2d 233, 235, 387 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214-15 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
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education of children,39 an interest evidenced by the existence of com-
pulsory education laws as long ago as 1861."0 The complex nature of
today's society suggests that the public interest in education extends
far beyond requiring a high school education,41 especially where the
child possesses the scholastic ability required to benefit from college.42
The examination of the probable expectations of the parents and child
I See International Textbook Co. v. Connally, 206 N.Y. 188, 195, 99 N.E. 722, 725 (1912)
("A common school education ... is essential to the transaction of business and the ade-
quate discharge of civil and political duties."); Grant v. Grant, 60 Ohio App. 2d 277, 396
N.E.2d 1037 (1977). The court in Grant enforced an agreement, incorporated into the
divorce decree, that the ex-husband would provide a college education to his children. Even
though the performance of this agreement would require the father to support the children
past the age of majority, the court noted the public policy reasons behind its enforcement:
More than an estimated eleven million high school students will go on to ac-
credited colleges .... The parents of these potential college students have a
legitimate interest in providing a college education for them. It is sound public
policy of the state of Ohio to encourage, rather than discourage, such interest.
Id. at 281, 396 N.E.2d at 1040. See also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *450-51;
Washburn, supra note 11, at 325-26.
1* See Carlile, Compulsory Attendance Laws in the United States; Historical
Background, 4 EDUC. L. AD. 35 (1936).
The societal interest in fostering higher learning is evidenced by the many publicly sup-
ported colleges and universities in the country. Of the 11,784,900 students enrolled in 1975
in institutions of higher learning, 8,834,500 were enrolled in such universities. U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEPT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979 § 5,
Table 267 (100th ed.). That such a large proportion of students attend public colleges and
universities has often been alluded to by the courts in college support cases. See, e.g.,
Calogeras v. Calogeras, 82 Ohio L. Abst. 438, 447, 163 N.E.2d 713, 720 (Juv. Ct. 1959); Esteb
v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 183, 244 P. 264, 267 (1926). This interest is further evidenced by
the existence of many federal and state programs which provide financial assistance to col-
lege students. For a general description of the federal financial assistance programs
available to college students, see U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, OFFICE
OF EDUCATION, STUDENT CONSUMERS GUIDE, SIX FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID PROGRAMS, 1979-80.
41 See Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769 (1960). In Pass, the court explained the
reasons why a higher education is important in today's society:
[I]f... the citizens of tomorrow are to take their rightful place in a complex
oider of society and government, and 'discharge the duties of citizenship as
well as meet with success the responsibilities devolving upon them in their
relations with their fellow man, the church, the state and nation, it must be
recognized that their parents owe them a duty to the extent of their financial
capacity to provide for them the training and education .... It is a duty which
the parent not only owes to his child, but to the state as well .... We can see
no good reason why this duty should not extend to a college education.
Id. at 458, 118 So. 2d at 773; accord, Calogeros v. Calogeros, 82 Ohio L. Abst. 438, 446-47,
163 N.E.2d 713, 719-20 (Juv. Ct. 1959); Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 731.(Fla. 1975). But see
Friedman, Higher Schooling in America, PUB. INTEREST, Spring, 1968, at 108. Friedman
questions whether higher education actually produces such intangible benefits as good
citizenship and community leadership. Id. at 110-11.
42 In Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926), the noncustodial father argued
that a high school education was enough to enable his daughter to be capable of self-
support. The court noted, however, that the child showed exceptional promise in the
teaching profession and had no aptitude for the type of work for which high school had
prepared her. Thus, without a college education, the child would be unable to nurture her
talents. See Anderson v. Anderson, 437 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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prior to the divorce furthers the public interest in education by ensur-
ing that those children who would have attended college had their
parents remained together will not be prevented from doing so because
of their parents' divorce. Where a noncustodial parent refuses to offer
college support to his child, the child may be forced either to seek finan-
cial assistance from whatever source that is available43 or to forego ad-
vanced studies altogether." In a society which generally expects
parents to contribute to the costs of educating their children to the ex-
tent that they are financially able,45 a child should not be forced to "rely
on the bounty of others"4 where the noncustodial parent has the means
to provide college support. Reliance on outside aid in such a situation
would reduce the amount of financial aid available to students whose
parents truly cannot afford to assist them in attaining a college educa-
tion.
The Average Family Factor
By determining whether a college education was something the
parents could have been expected to provide to the child had they re-
mained married, the court ensures that divorced parents will provide
the child with the same college support they would have provided if the
family had remained intact. Some courts, when making this determina-
tion, consider an additional factor-the "average family factor."4 ' This
factor involves an examination of what the court perceives to be the
" See Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71, 275 A.2d 132, 136 (1972) (student loans would be
required if noncustodial parent refused to support).
" See Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 119, 202 P. 213, 215 (1921) (when father refused to
make support payments, son forced to quit college to pay debts incurred in obtaining his
education).
"HARVARD STUDENT AGENCIES, INC.. MAKING IT: A GUIDE TO STUDENT FINANCES 23 (A.
Johnson ed. 1973); see Educational Testing Service, GAPSFAS (1980). See also Indianapolis
Star, Feb. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 4 (cuts in federal spending on higher education will force
parents of students to pay greater share of educational costs).
" Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 42, 163 N.E.2d 840, 845 (1959); see Common-
wealth ex reL. Hanerkam v. Hanerkam, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 186, 289 A.2d 742, 744-45
(1972) (unless undue hardship present, availability of loans, grants and part-time work does
not negate duty of father to support his child in college).
47 This factor, although not given any particular label in the cases, will be referred to as
the "average family factor" throughout the remainder of this note. The use of the term
"average" in that label is somewhat of a misnomer, as the courts do not use any statistical
methods to arrive at what they believe is the average family. Instead, the courts assume
that either most parents generally are or are not supporting their children in college. This
assumption is generally not supported by the court with citations to any evidence. See, e.g.,
Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 38, 253 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1979); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash.
174, 183, 244 P. 264, 267 (1926). Some more recent cases do, however, cite studies which sup-
port their assumptions. See In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980). In
any event, the term average, when used in this sense, only reflects the court's perception of
what people generally are doing.
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level of college support provided by average, intact, similarly situated
families.48 If the court determines that most similarly situated families
provide college support to their children, then the court may award the
college support. Perhaps the most useful function of the average family
factor is to guide the court in determining whether the parents would
have provided educational support to their child if they had remained
married when the evidence of their prior intent is not clear. 9 The court
could then rationalize an award of college support by noting that the
child is merely receiving the same kind of support that children in the
average family receive.
Of course, if the average family factor is to militate in favor of an
award of college support, courts must determine that a college educa-
tion is normally provided to children of an average family. Courts have
not always made such a determination, however. While not dealing
directly with the average family factor, one early case, Middlebury v.
Chandler,50 did examine the role of higher education in the life of the
average person. In Middlebury, the issue was whether a college educa-
tion was a "necessary" for which an infant could bind himself by con-
tract." The court reasoned that the meaning of the term "necessary"
" See, e.g., Ogle v. Ogle, 275 Ala. 483, 487, 156 So. 2d 345, 349 (1963) (quoting Esteb v.
Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 183, 244 P. 264, 267 (1924)); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 III. 2d 563,
580, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1390 (1978); Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 38, 163 N.E.2d 840,
843 (1959); Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 593, 601-02, 363 P.2d 795, 802 (1961); Risinger v. Ris-
inger, 273 S.C. 36, 38, 253 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1979); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592,
.601-02, 575 P.2d 201, 207 (1978). See also In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa
1980). In Vrba, the noncustodial father challenged the constitutionality of IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.1(2) (West Supp. 1980), on equal protection grounds. This section provides, inter alia,
that the child support obligation may include the obligation to support a child properly
enrolled in college until that child is 22 years old. The father argued that "the statute
creates an unreasonable classification by treating adult children of divorced parents dif-
ferently from adult children of married parents. While divorced parents may be required to
support their adult children ... there is no similar obligation for those parents who remain
married." I& at 201. The court, in holding the classification to be reasonable, said it was the
conclusion of the legislature that married parents support their children who are attending
college and that the statute was a reasonable means of resolving a problem unique to
broken homes. Id at 202. In this instance, it was the legislature, not the court, who com-
pared the college support provided by married parents with college support provided by
divorced parents. See generally Washburn, supra note 11, at 327-28.
" See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
60 16 Vt. 683 (1844).
"1 Id at 685. The old common law rule was that contracts made by infants were voidable
at the option of the infant. 2 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 223 (3d
ed. J. Jaeger 1959). Certain categories of contracts which were beneficial to the infant, how-
ever, were valid. One of these categories was a contract for necessaries. J. CALAMARI & J.
PERRILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8-8 (2d ed. 1977). Obviously, items which are required
for the physical survival of the infant are necessaries. Id. Whether a college education is a
necessary depends upon the circumstances and the infant's status in life. I&. The doctrine of
necessaries in domestic relations law in many ways parallels the contract law doctrine of
necessaries. In domestic relations law, the husband is liable for necessaries purchased by
his wife or children when he refuses to provide them. H. CLARK, supra note 10, at 189-92.
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was relative, "having reference ... to what may be called the conven-
tional necessities of others in the same walk of life as the infant." 2
Although it conceded that college has its benefits, the court concluded
that college was not a "conventional necessity"' of "men in general"'
since "the mass of our citizens pass through life without [it]." 55-It is true
that the average person did not have a college education at the time
Middlebury was decided." The real significance of the decision,
however, is its reference to the educational level of "men in general" as
a means of determining whether college was a necessary. Consequently,
the status of college as a necessary would change as more persons at-
tend college.
It was quite a while after Middlebury, however, before any court
perceived an increase in the number of persons attending college. In
Esteb v. Esteb,7 the court observed that there had been significant
changes in the accessibility of higher education to the average person
since the time of Middlebury:
An opportunity at that early date for a common school education was
small, for a high school education less, and for a college education was
almost impossible to the average family .... Where the college
graduate of that day was the exception, today such a person may
almost be said to be the rule ....
Not only did the Esteb court refer to the average person, but it also
referred to the "average family," making it one of the first courts to ap-
ply the average family factor. By the latter reference the court seemed
to imply that at the time of Middlebury it was impossible for the
average family to send their children to college. Although not explicitly
As in the contract law dealing with the power of an infant to contract for necessaries, the
definition of necessaries in domestic relations law is relative to the economic position of the
family. Id. Thus, it is easy to see why Middlebury's discussion of college as a necessary has
been cited by college support cases which were not concerned with the power of infants to
contract. See, eg., Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65, 68, 171 N.E. 386, 387 (1930); Jackman
v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 640, 109 P.2d 860, 866 (1941); cf Inker & McGrath, supra note 11, at
231-32 (criticizing use of Middlebury in college support cases).
1" 16 Vt. at 686.
" Id
u Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
" There were a total of 9,371 bachelors' or first professional degrees conferred in 1870,
some 26 years after Middlebury. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES 385 (Bicentennial ed. 1975). This was out of a total population of 38,558,371.
Id. at 15. By comparison, there were 827,234 such degrees conferred in 1970, id. at 385, out
of a total population of 203,211,926. Id. at 15.
57 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926). This oft-cited case is considered a landmark in the
field of educational support. Veron, supra note 1, at 662.
" 138 Wash. at 182, 244 P. at 267 (emphasis added). For other early cases dealing with
education beyond high school as a necessary, see Refer v. Refer, 102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750
(1936); Payette v. Payette, 85 N.H. 297, 157 A. 531 (1931); Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 112, 202 P.
213 (1921).
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declared by the court, the converse of that implication, arising from the
court's references to the large number of college graduates and public
colleges and the public policy of furthering higher education,59 is that it
was possible for the average family of the 1920's to send its children to
college.
A different emphasis, however, was given by other courts of the
Esteb era when confronted with the college support issue. One court,'
in considering the college support provided by the average family ex-
plained:
It is well known that there are worthy parents in all parts of the
country, with sufficient means to do so, who do not send their
children to college .... Many parents may conclude that it is best for
their children's education that they earn [their own] money for their
higher education.61
The court was undoubtably correct in its conclusion that some
parents feel that that their children should pay for their own education.
Nonetheless, while some married parents may genuinely feel that self-
support strengthens the character of the child, this argument could too
easily be used as an excuse or rationalization for a refusal of college sup-
port in a divorce setting. Moreover, this argument ignores the fact that
most parents do provide some college support to their children,"2 and
should not be accepted by courts absent a strong showing by the
resisting parent that he held this educational philosophy prior to the in-
ception of the marital strife.
In recent college support cases, the courts have continued to consider
the average family factor. The Kansas Supreme Court in Allison v.
Allison' took judicial notice of the changes in the social and economic
environment which rendered a college education much more valuable
than in the past. A college education had become so highly valued that
19 138 Wash. at 182-83, 244 P. at 267.
Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65, 171 N.E. 386 (1930).
61 Id. at 69, 171 N.E. at 387 (emphasis added); accord, Commonwealth ex TeL Binney v.
Binney, 146 Pa. Super. Ct. 374, 380, 22 A.2d 598, 601 (1941).
1 See R. FREEMAN, CRISIS IN COLLEGE FINANCE? 100 (1965); S. HARRIS, A STATISTICAL
PORTRAIT OF HIGHER EDUCATION 100, 114-23 (1972); text accompanying note 85 infra.
188 Kan. 593, 363 P.2d 795 (1961).
Id. at 601, 363 P.2d at 802; accord, In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa
1980); Commonwealth ex ret Yannacone v. Yannacone, 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 244, 247 n.1, 251
A.2d 694, 696 n.1 (1969) (Hoffman, J., dissenting). Judge Hoffman notes "the crucial impor-
tance of a college education in today's society" and "that a college degree is a vitally impor-
tant prerequisite to a successful commercial career" Id.
In recent years, however, it has been asserted that a college degree is no longer as
economically valuable as it once was. See, e.g., R. FREEMAN, THE OVEREDUCATED AMERICAN
10-31 (1976). The depressed labor market for college graduates and a decrease in their real
salaries were cited as some of the causes. Id. But see Campbell & Curtis, Graduate Educa-
tion and Private Rates of Return: A Review of Theory and Empiricising, 13 ECON. INQUIRY
99 (1975) (rejecting rate of return as a method of evaluating graduate education).
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"[w]here the parents' economic circumstances are adequate it is
commonplace to send their children to college."'85 The average family
factor was also considered in Risinger v. Risinger," where the South
Carolina Supreme Court decided that the need for an education would
justify a support award under a child support statute. 7 The court noted
that many students, by their attendence at college, have diminished
their ability to support themselves without assistance and stated that
"most parents feel an obligation to help, and do help the child."68 In both
these cases the courts again considered the support provided by
families they believed to be average in an effort to determine whether
college support should be awarded.
It should be stressed, however, that the consideration of the average
family factor should only supplement, not replace, the court's careful
consideration of the individual circumstances of each particular family.
There are certain factors which must always be considered, particularly
the financial capacity of the noncustodial parent.69 Obviously, if the
court finds that a parent lacks the financial capacity to provide college
support, then the average family factor is irrelevant. 70
188 Kan. at 601, 363 P.2d at 802 (emphasis added).
273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979).
, The section of the statute construed by the court provides:
[The court shall have jurisdiction:
(4)'To make all orders for support run until the further order of the Court,
except that orders for support of a child shall run until the child is twenty-one
years of age, or until the child is sooner married or becomes self-supporting;
or, where there are physical or mental disabilities of the child or other excep-
tional circumstances that warrant it, in the discretion of the Court, during any
period and beyond the child's minority as such physical or mental disabilities
may continue.
Act of May 22, 1968, No. 1195, § 24(b)(4), 1968 S.C. Acts 2718 (current version at S.C. CODE §
14-21-810(a)(4) (Supp. 1980)). The court noted that the factors which constituted exceptional
circumstances in this case were the scholastic ability of the child, the indications that she
would benefit from college, the financial ability of the noncustodial parent and that the child
could not go to college without the assistance of that parent. 273 S.C. at 39, 253 S.E.2d at
653-54. The court was careful not to limit "exceptional circumstances" to these factors only,
emphasizing that family court judges must have the power to consider other pertinent fac-
tors. Id., 253 S.E.2d at 653. This is typical of the discretion left in the hands of the trial
court when considering college support. See note 25 & accompanying text supra.
273 S.C. at 38, 253 S.E.2d at 653 (emphasis added). But compare the approach of the
Risinger court with the approach taken by the Utah Supreme Court in Ferguson v.
Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978). The court in Ferguson acknowledged that parents
often give college support to their adult children, but refused to order such support: "Or-
dinarily, a parent will be more than willing to aid and assist an adult child in securing a col-
lege education; however, one should not be compelled to do so by a court order, except in
some unusual circumstance, not present here." 578 P.2d at 1275 (emphasis added). Here the
court referred to the college support provided by other parents, but simply ignored it. Ac-
cord, Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864, 865-66 (Utah 1978).
" See notes 26-27 & accompanying text supra.
" See Golay v. Golay, 35 Wash. 2d 122, 124, 210 P.2d 1022, 1023 (1949) (parental
sacrifices to help children attend college common, but noncustodial father not in financial
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Once the financial capacity of the noncustodial parent has been
established, equitable considerations support the application of the
average family factor. In fairness to the parents of intact families who ac-
cept their social obligations to educate their children, the average family
factor operates to place similar responsibilities on divorced parents. This
policy was espoused in another Washington case, Underwood v. Under-
wood:" "Untold sacrifices are made by parents who remain steadfast to
their marital obligations in order to educate their children. The same
responsibility rests on parents who seek and obtain a divorce."72 The court
thus is attempting to equalize the sacrifices made by divorced and mar-
ried parents when considering college support issues by requiring the
same degree of sacrifice on the part of divorced parents as that made by
married parents.7
3
These questions of fairness and equality arose in Childers v.
Childers74 in a somewhat different context. In Childers, the court was
concerned with the limits of the noncustodial parent's duty to provide
college support to his children. Applying an equal protection analysis,
the court struck down the Dissolution of Marriage Act of 197375 because
it imposed a greater duty of support on the class of divorced parents
than that imposed on the class of married parents, as the latter were
position which would allow such sacrifice). Some noncustodial parents of lipited means have
been found to have the requisite financial capacity to provide college support. See, eg.,
Dorman v. Dorman, 251 Ind. 272, 241 N.E.2d 50 (1968) (noncustodial father required to pay
$40 for college support out of $75 weekly salary). But see Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v.
Williams, 242 Pa. Super. Ct. 550, 364 A.2d 410 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel- Schearer v.
Schearer, 208 Pa. Super. Ct. 196, 222 A.2d 620 (1968).
One could view the consideration of the financial ability of the noncustodial parent as
subsumed within the average family factor since the application of that factor necessarily
entails an examination of families with similar financial resources as the one before the
court. See note 47 & accompanying text supra. That is to say, a court would not expect a
noncustodial parent with an annual income of $20,000 to provide the same support as a
parent with an annual income of $500,000.
" 162 Wash. 204, 298 P. 318 (1931).
2I at 210, 298 P. at 320.
" The question of how much sacrifice should be required of the noncustodial parent
when ordered to provide college support was discussed in Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v.
Sommerville, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 640, 190 A.2d 182 (1963). The court observed that while it
may require a father to make great sacrifices in order to support his young child, it would
not require the same degree of sacrifice of the father when ordering him to support his
child in college. But it did require some sacrifice: "We are not suggesting that a father
should be required to support a child in college only when ... he could do so without mak-
ing any personal sacrifices. Most parents who send a child to college sacrifice to do so." Id.
at 644, 190 A.2d at 184. As did the court in Underwood, the court in Ulmer seemed intent
upon imposing a duty of sacrifice on the divorced parent similar to the sacrifice made by
married parents when sending their children to college.
" 15 Wash. App. 792, 552 P.2d 83 (1976), affd in part & rev'd in part, 89 Wash. 2d 592,
575 P.2d 201 (1978).
" Ch. 157, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1215 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.09 (Supp. 1981)).
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free to bid a "fiscal farewell" to their children over the age of eighteen
while the former may have a continued duty to support such children. 8
The court held that there was no reasonable basis for such a
distinction 77 On appeal, 8 the Washington Supreme Court rejected this
reasoning, in part because the operation of the Act in fact created no
unequal treatment79 since most married parents with the requisite finan-
cial capacity provide college support for their children. The court ap-
plied the average family factor, observing that "[t]he fact that most mar-
ried parents choose willingly to make financial sacrifices for their
children's education, including college and regardless of age, seems to
have been disregarded."8 The Childers court, in attempting to ensure
that children of divorced parents receive the same advantages as
children of married parents, noted further that "[t]he child of divorced
parents should be in no worse position than a child from an [intact] home
whose parents could be expected to supply a college education.... To
terminate support when the parents are divorced creates a special
,1 15 Wash. App. at 796, 552 P.2d at 85. The particular section of the Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act of 1973 which gave rise to the equal protection issue dealt with the termination of
child support. Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the divorce
decree, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child or
by the death of the parent obligated to support the child. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.170
(Supp. 1981). It was maintained by the custodial mother that § 170 provided the trial court
with the authority to award child support regardless of the age of the child. 15 Wash. App.
at 795, 552 P.2d at 85. Section 170 thereby created two classes; one of married parents and
one of divorced parents, as under this reading divorced parents could be forced by the
courts to support their children past the age of majority while married parents could not.
This being the case, the court examined this section in the light of the privileges and im-
munities provision of article 1 of the Washington constitution and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The Washington
constitution provides: "No law shall be passed granting any citizen, class of citizens, or cor-
poration other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall
not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12. The equal pro-
tection clause of the United States Constitution reads: "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The court then tested the classifications under the equal protection test set forth in
State ex rel. Bacich v. Huse, 187 Wash. 75, 59 P.2d 1101 (1936). This test required that there
be a reasonable ground for the distinction of the classes and that the statute treat all per-
sons alike within the created classes. The court found that § 170 failed the first test because
when a child reaches the age of 18 there is no longer a reasonable ground to distinguish the
two classes. 15 Wash. App. at 796, 552 P.2d at 85; accord, Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482, 485
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). But see In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980);
Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1978). See generally Veron, supra note 1, at
668-83; 54 WASH. L. REV. 459, 465-72 (1979).
" 15 Wash. App. at 796, 552 P.2d at 85.
71 Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978).
" Id. at 605, 575 P.2d at 209 ("This 'classification' ... results in no actual inequality.").
The other reason for rejecting the lower court's assertion was that there was a reasonable
basis for distinguishing the two classes: the state's interest in the welfare of the children
and society as a whole is sufficient. Id.
Id. at 601, 575 P.2d at 207 (emphasis added).
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disadvantage not shared by children whose parents remain together."8
The Childers court's assertion that the Act does not treat married
parents and divorced parents unequally is questionable at best. First,
there is no doubt that under the Act a court can require that a divorced
parent provide college support to his children while the same court
could not impose a similar requirement on married parents.82 Second,
even if most married parents do provide college support to their
children, undoubtably there are some who do not.8 3 Nevertheless, this
flaw is not fatal to the court's analysis because, as the Childers court
recognized, such unequal treatment of divorced parents is justified in
order to minimize the prejudice to the child caused by the divorce: "The
irremediable disadvantages to children whose parents have divorced
are great enough. To minimize them, when possible, is certainly a
legitimate government interest."'
Childers used empirical evidence to support the assertion that
parents often provide college support for their children. The court cited
three studies concerning the financing of college education from which
it concluded that parental support accounted for a "substantial percent-
age of the cost of a college education." 5 This data gave force to the
court's contention that the failure of the divorced parent to provide col-
lege support was a competitive disadvantage to the child. 8
81 Id. at 602, 575 P.2d at 207-08 (quoting Washburn, supra note 11, at 327, 329). See also
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); In re Marriage of Vrban,
293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980). In Kujawinsk the court rejected a similar equal protection at-
tack on the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, Pub. Act 80-922, § 513, 1977
Ill. Laws 2675 (codified at ILL. ANN. Stat. ch. 40, 513 (Smith-Hurd 1980), on the grounds
that to order divorced parents to educate their children to the same extent as may be
reasonably expected of married parents was rationally related to the protection of the
child. 71 Ill. 2d at 580, 376 N.E.2d at 1390.
"2 See 89 Wash. 2d at 601, 575 P.2d at 207. In Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978), a Florida court observed that such treatment was unequal. Cf White v.
White, 296 So. 2d 619, 623-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (no suit by child lies to require mar-
ried parents to provide college support); Commonwealth ex reL Miller v. Rice, 1 Adams
County Legal J. 91, 92 (Pa. 1959) (if court could require divorced parents to provide college
support, it could also require married parents to do so).
8 See White v. White, 296 So. 2d 619, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Morris v. Morris, 92
Ind. App. 65, 69, 171 N.E. 386, 387 (1930); Commonwealth ex rel Binney v. Binney, 146 Pa.
Super. Ct. 374, 380, 22 A.2d 598, 601 (1941); text accompanying note 61 supra.
" 89 Wash. 2d at 604, 575 P.2d at 208. Contra Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("no reasonable grounds to treat adult children of divorced parents any
differently than adult children of married parents").
81 89 Wash. 2d at 601 n.3, 575 P.2d at 207 n.3. The sources cited were: R. FREEMAN, supra
note 62, at 100, S. HARRIS, supra note 62, at 114-23; HARVARD STUDENT AGENCIES, INC., supra
note 45, at 23. The same sources were cited by the court in In re Marriage of Vrban, 293
N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980).
8 This force was lacking in Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926). For a
discussion of the validity of the Esteb court's assumption as to the numbers of the college
graduates, see 20 ORE. L. REV. 377, 382 (1941).
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Judicial reliance on the average family factor is not a panacea designed
to replace much needed discretion in the educational support area.8 7 The
utility of the factor is that, through an examination of the support pro-
vided by families which the courts view as average, the courts are of-
fered another method by which they can measure the probable expecta-
tions the parents would have had had they remained married; in the
process, the courts are placing no greater burden on divorced parents
than the burden voluntarily assumed by most married parents. Whether
this burden is normally assumed voluntarily at the graduate school
level, however, is an open question.
GRADUATE SCHOOL SUPPORT
There have been relatively few cases 88 which have dealt directly with
the graduate school support issue. Nevertheless, the increase in
graduate degrees as a percentage of the total number of degrees confer-
red89 in combination with the increasing tendency of the courts to ignore
arbitrary limitations on the educational support obligation" indicates
that this issue may arise more frequently in the future. When these
" See notes 24-31 & accompanying text supra. The factor will not even be relevant in
states which use the age of the child as an arbitrary limit on college support. See note 1 &
accompanying text supra.
U One of the earliest decisions involving graduate or professional school was Streitwolf
v. Streitwolf, 58 N.J. Eq. 570, 43 A. 904 (1899). As the child was only 19 years of age and
had no undergraduate degree, the utility of this case in a modern discussion of graduate
school support is limited.
Much later, a Pennsylvania court in In re George Earnshaw, 6 Ches. Co. Rep. 274 (Pa.
1954), awarded graduate school support in the context of an incompetence proceeding. Here
an unemployed, 23 year-old daughter of an adjudged weakminded father had been sup-
ported by his estate during her college career, and the court extended the support so that
she could pursue a master's degree in library science. Id. at 275. The court reasoned that
the omission of the word "minor" as a modifier of the word "children" from the In-
competents' Estates Act of 1951, No. 158, § 643, 1951-1952 Pa. Laws 612, was an indication
that adult as well as minor children were to be supported under the statute. 6 Ches. Co.
Rep. at 275. A similar mode of statutory interpretation has been used by other courts to
avoid the jurisdictional problems posed by the age of majority when they order support
beyond that age. See French v. French, 117 N.H. 696, 699, 378 A.2d 1127, 1129 (1977) (con-
struing Act of June 18, 1975, ch. 426, § 2, 1975 N.H. Laws 459 (codified at N.H. STAT. ANN. §
458.17 (Supp. 1979))); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 595-97, 575 P.2d 201, 204-05
(1978) (construing Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1973, ch. 157, §§ 10, 17, 1973 Wash. Laws
1st Ex. Sess. 1215 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.100, .170 (Supp. 1981); cf
Greenberg v. Greenberg, 27 A.D.2d 952, 279 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1967) (postgraduate work is not
an unusual circumstance); In re Kelly's Estate, 259 A.D. 1024, 20 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1940),
modified & affd, 285 N.Y. 139, 33 N.E.2d 62 (1941) (college defined as undergraduate only).
" U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 40, Table 281. Between 1950 and 1977, the
number of graduate degrees as a percentage of the total number of degrees conferred rose
from 13% to 26.2%. Id. The total number of graduate degrees conferred increased over
500%, from about 65,000 in 1950 to over 351,000 in 1977. Id.
10 See generally Veron, supra note 1, at 650-669.
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cases arise, the courts should examine whether the policies espoused in
college support cases are equally applicable to the graduate school sup-
port issue.
Avoidance of Prejudice to the Child
Some courts, when confronted with the college support issue, have
based their awards of college support on the policy that a divorce should
not prevent a child from receiving the same college support he would
have received had his parents remained married. 1 If this policy is of
central importance, then it should make no difference that the divorce
causes the noncustodial parent to refuse to provide college or graduate
school support. In either case, an award of support should be given
where it is shown that the parents would have paid for the schooling
had the parents remained married. 2 If courts are to further the policy of
ensuring that life goes on for the child as if there had been no divorce,
they should be more concerned with determining the probable expecta-
tions of the parents and child with respect to his education and less con-
cerned with the age of the child and his ability to support himself.
Of course, there are circumstances where the blind furtherance of this
policy could lead to absurd results. Certainly parents who indicate a
desire, while married, to provide their son with all the education he
desires should not be required after divorce to finance their son's at-
tempt to obtain multiple graduate degrees over a thirty year period. 3
However, such cases can be accommodated by the court's examining all
the relevant factors to determine if it is truly necessary to award the
support in order to avoid the prejudice to the child. 4 Moreover, the
average family factor could be used by the court in such a case as ra-
tionale for denying the support since parental support at this level is un-
common.
95
The policy of avoiding prejudice to the child was given heavy em-
phasis in the most recent of the few decisions involving graduate school
support, Ross v. Ross." Ross was a post-divorce proceeding in which the
custodial mother moved to compel the noncustodial father to continue
making child support payments in accord with the terms of the divorce
decree. 7 Under that decree, the father was obligated to support his
See notes 16-16 & accompanying xexi supra.
Ross v. Ross, 167 N.J. Super. 441, 445-48, 400 A.2d 1233, 1235-37 (1979).
See Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 730 (Fla. 1975) (father argued that he should not have
to support his child while the latter "[lounged] around in college for 10 years").See notes 25-31 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 110-15 & accompanying text infra.
167 N.J. Super. 441, 400 A.2d 1233 (Ch. Div. 1979).
Id at 443, 400 A.2d at 1234-35.
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daughter "until emancipated." 8 The primary question before the court
was whether the twenty-three year-old daughter, a first-year law stu-
dent, was emancipated. The court reasoned that, before it could con-
sider that issue, it had to answer the "threshold question" of whether
the parents would have supported their daughter in law school but for
the divorce. 9 After finding that such support would have been provided,
the court concluded that she was not emancipated in light of the finan-
cial capabilities of the parties and the ability and attitude of the
daughter. The father was ordered to continue contributing to her sup-
port until her graduation from law school.' 0
The court stressed that an affirmative answer to the .threshold ques-
tion was "in no way ... dispositive of the issue,"'0 1 for other relevant fac-
tors"0 2 must also be considered before a final decision could be reached
as to whether the support request should be granted. Yet the court failed
in its attempt to make two distinct inquiries-one involving the
threshold question of what the parents would have done but for the
divorce and another involving the analysis of relevant factors -because
the court reviewed the other factors in order to determine whether the
divorce had actually prejudiced the daughter by causing the father to
withhold support he would have given had he remained married. °3
One of the factors considered by the Ross court-"[t]he relationship of
the schooling in question . . . to the overall, long-range goals of the
child"'° 4-is particularly salient to the issue of graduate school support.
Where the child aspires to a professional career, both college and
graduate work will be prerequisites to obtaining that goal. Accordingly,
where a child has a long-standing goal of obtaining a professional degree
" Id
The threshold question was: "Had there not been a separation and divorce, would the
parties, while living together, have sent their daughter to law school and financed that
schooling?" Id. at 445, 400 A.2d at 1235.
'N Id at 448, 400 A.2d at 1237.
,' Id at 445, 400 A.2d at 1236.
"' The factors considered by the court were:
1. The amount of support (or school cost) sought.
2. The ability of the noncustodial parent to pay that cost, and its relation to
the type of schooling sought.
3. The financial position of the custodial parent.
4. The commitment ... of the child to the schooling in question.
5. The child's relationship to the noncustodial paying parent.
6. The relationship of the schooling in question to any prior training and,
generally, the relationship to the overall, long-range goals of the child.
Id. at 445-46, 400 A.2d at 1236.
10 In answering the threshold question, the court considered "the respective incomes of
the parties; the fact of only having one child, and the early indicators in this case of Jane's
interest in law school," id, 400 A.2d at 1235, all of which are factors the court later
discusses. See note 102 supra.
1" 167 N.J. Super. at 446, 400 A.2d at 1236. For a discussion of factors considered in col-
lege support cases, see notes 25-31 & accompanying text supra.
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and has already obtained the required college degree, he should be
allowed to continue receiving support through graduate school.' 5 Where
the goal of the child is known, the court should also consider the pro-
priety of making an award that includes graduate school support at the
same time it makes a college support award, or at least it should add a
provision to the order allowing for a rehearing when the child nears
graduate school. 10
The court in Ross, in awarding graduate school support, focused on
whether the father would have supported his daughter in law school had
he remained married and on the long-standing goals of the child. Where
the courts focus on other factors, however, the likelihood that graduate
school support will be awarded may diminish. In Colantoni v. Colan-
toni,'01 the court noted that there are many ways a medical student
could support himself and denied the requested support. Perhaps if the
court had instead concentrated on whether the father, had he remained
with his wife, would have supported his son in medical school, the sup-
port would have been awarded. The court admitted that the father was
financially able to provide the support' 8 and a further inquiry may have
revealed that the son had a long-standing desire to attend medical
school.
The Average Family Factor and Graduate School Support
The courts in graduate school cases have yet to apply the average
family factor. Nevertheless, this factor may even be more appropriate in
these cases than it is in the cases concerning college support. Since it
offers the courts further evidence regarding the graduate school sup-
port provided by other intact families, this factor enables courts to place
the child in the same financial environment as children of similarly
situated families whose parents remain married. In addition, where it is
shown that most parents do not provide graduate school support, courts
would have less reason to award such support because divorced parents
would then be shouldering a burden that is not expected even of mar-
ried parents. To place such a burden on divorced parents exceeds one of
the primary purposes of the average family factor-to ensure that the
105 This is a very important factor in Ross. The court stressed that the child had planned
on a legal career since she was in high school and that the only way for her to attain that
goal was through attending law school. 167 N.J. Super. at 447-48, 400 A.2d at 1237.
10 See In re Marriage of Edelstein, 82 Ill. App. 3d 574, 577, 403 N.E.2d 323, 326 (1980); In
re Marriage of Eusterman, 41 Or. App. 717, 598 P.2d 1274 (1979).
10, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 46, 281 A.2d 662 (1971). In Colantoni, the father discontinued his
support payments for his son, a medical student, when the latter married and changed his
state of residence. The court did not order the father to resume paying the support, stating
that the mother had failed to rebut the presumption that a child is emancipated at age 21.
The court also noticed the widespread availability of financial aid to most students.
' I& at 49, 281 A.2d at 664.
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educational support responsibilities placed on divorced parents will be
roughly equivalent to the educational support provided by married
parents."9 A finding that average families do not provide graduate
school support, however, should not in and of itself act to deny a request
for such support. It should, at the very least, place a heavier burden on
the custodial parent to show that graduate school support would have
been provided by the parents had they remained married.
Of course, the key inquiry when applying the average family factor in
graduate school support cases is whether parents of graduate students
normally provide such support. Overall, empirical studies have indicated
that parental support of graduate students is minimal. ' Yet this may
not be the end of the inquiry as the amount of parental support received
by graduate students may be linked to the discipline the child is study-
ing.' While graduate students studying the sciences "switch from
dependency on their parents and their own earnings to almost exclusive
dependence on fellowships, research assistantships, or teaching assis-
tantships to finance their education," '12 the parents of students studying
law, medicine or dentistry were expected by their schools to "continue
paying tuition and living expenses" of their children.' Since at least
some graduate students receive or are at least expected by their schools
to receive"' substantial parental support while in graduate school,
equitable considerations support the application of the average family
factor in such instances."1
See text accompanying notes 71-81 supra.
"' S. HARRIS, supra note 62, at 204; cf. NAT'L BD. ON GRADUATE EDUCATION, FEDERAL
POLICY ALTERNATIVES TOWARD GRADUATE EDUCATION 49 (1949) (aid to graduate students
should not be linked to "comparative financial status" of parents); Educational Testing Ser-
vice, GAPSFAS (1980) (parents of graduate students expected to offer them some financial
support).
"' V. Walbot, On the Financial Aids Received by Survey Participants During
Undergraduate, Graduate, and Postdoctoral Education 7-8 (paper presented in Feb. 1978,
for the American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, ERIC, No. Ed. 155 967).
"' Id. at 7.
" Id. at 8. Perhaps this difference can be attributed to the different times at which col-
lege students decide to pursue education beyond a college degree. It has been found that,
while many college students who decide to embark on a legal or medical career make that
decision by the time they graduate from college, the decision to seek a doctorate is most
often made at a point much later in a student's career. A. HEARD, THE LOST YEARS IN
GRADUATE EDUCATION 9 (1963). A long-standing goal of attending graduate school is an im-
portant factor in graduate school support cases. See notes 104-06 & accompanying text
supra.
"' The Graduate and Professional School Financial Aid Service (GAPSFAS), a program
sponsored by the Graduate and Professional Financial Aid Council to assist graduate and
professional schools in processing financial aid applications of their students, expects that
parents with the financial capacity to do so should offer financial support to their children
who are attending graduate or professional school. Parents of graduate students, however,
are not expected to contribute as much as parents of college students. Educational Testing
Service, GAPSFAS (1980).
ill See notes 74-85 & accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION
In college support cases, courts have tried to determine whether the
parents would have been expected to support their child while he at-
tended college had there been no divorce. In making this determination,
courts have examined whether there was any pre-divorce plan to send
the child to college, or where no such plan existed, the inquiry extends
to a myriad of relevant factors, including the financial capacity of the
parents and the scholastic ability of the child. The primary policy fur-
thered by these examinations is to prevent prejudice to the child
resulting from the divorce. In accord with this policy is the courts' con-
sideration of the average family factor, where the courts compare the
family before them with what is perceived to be average, intact, similar-
ly situated families. By applying this factor, courts are able to offer both
a broader protection to the child and to ensure that divorced parents do
not shirk the parental responsibilities shouldered by most parents,
thereby unfairly shifting the burden of educational costs either to the
child or to society in general.
The issues involved in graduate school support cases are not inherent-
ly different simply because the child is older. Where it can be shown
that the parents would have supported the child in graduate school but
for the divorce, the policy of avoiding prejudice to the child caused by
the divorce dictates an award of graduate support. An examination of
the average family factor, however, reveals that parental support at the
graduate school level is much less common than similar support at the
college level. This lack of parental support at the graduate school level
suggests that a higher burden to show prejudice to the child should be
placed on the party requesting graduate school support, for if the
divorced parents are similar to other parents, they probably would not
have provided such support. Where the burden is met, however, the
award should be given.
J. ANDREW CRAWFORD
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